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Abstract
We analyze two-stage games where players may make binding oflers
of schemes for side payment acceptance (or rejection) as well as those
for side payments before choosing actions. We find that any set of
efficient actions is played on an equilibrium path of the tw0-stage game
when such bilateral contracts on side payments are interdependent.
1Introduction
Coase (1960) put forth an idea that if property rights are well-defined, and
bargaining is costless, then rational agents playing agame with externalities
should contract to come to an efficient point. Coase (1960) was not explicit
about the type of agreements between agents that are necessary as aform
of bargaining to reach efficiency, but the idea has been widely accepted by
economists.1
Contrary to the widespread belief in the idea, Jackson and Wilkie (2000)
pointed out that side contracting does not always lead to efficiency even
when there are no transactions costs, complete information, and binding
contracts. They studied games where agents may make binding offers of
’This is aprelminary version and the final form may be published elsewhere.
$\uparrow \mathrm{e}$-mail:h.kkori@livedoor.com
lMuch of the recent contracting literature has focused on imperfections related to costs
of contracting, asymmetric information, limited enforcement of contracts, and so forth.
Anderlini and Felli (2001) provide adiscussion on the relationship of that literature to
failures of the Coase theorem.
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strategy-contingent side payments before choosing actions, and found that
if there are only two agents, the agents are not always able to come to an
agreement that supports an efficient strategy profile as an equilibrium point
of the game. What kind of contracts will agents need to reach efficiency
generffiy?
According to Jackson andWilkie (2000), if there are three or more players,
each efficient strategy profile is played on an equilibrium path in the game
with side payments. However, Jackson and Wilkie (2000) only focused on
voluntarily offered side payments and assumed that such side payments would
always be accepted by transferees. This assumption might be thought of
as arbitrary since voluntarily offered side payments could be invalidated by
spontaneous rejection to receive them. Moreover the results of Jackson and
Wilkie (2000) depended upon another assumption as well that there is no
budget constraint with players’ transfer. Thus the question proposed above
seems to remain unanswered at all. What kind of bilateral contracts would
lead to efficiency even when agents face budget constraint with their transfer,
no matter what number of players there are? This is the question we address
in this paper.
We are to analyze tw0-stage games where players may make binding offers
of schemes for side payment acceptance (or rejection) as well as those for side
payments before choosing actions. Aside payment from aplayer, say 1, to
another, say 2, is implemented if and only if 1offers the payment and 2
accepts it. If 2rejects, then 1’s offer is not in effect, and the payoff for the
transfer remains with 1. We will see that every efficient strategy profile is
played on an equilibrium path of the tw0-stage game, no matter what number
of players there are, when the bilateral side contracts (transfer and receipt
schemes) are somehow interdependent. Moreover, we will reach asimilar
result even when equilibrium contracts are required to meet agents’ budget
constraint with their transfer.
In what follows, we explain the timing of the tw0-stage game and present
the model of the underlying game (the second-stage game) in Section 2. We
present several models of bilateral side contracts and show the corresponding
results in Sections 3-5. Some concluding remarks appear in Section 6.
2The Underlying Game
We consider tw0-stage games played as folows.
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Stage 1: Each player announces atransfer function profile (transfer scheme)
and areceipt function profile (transfer $\mathrm{a}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{p}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{e}/\mathrm{r}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{j}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}$ scheme), each of
which is assumed to be binding.
Stage 2: Each player chooses an action.
The players are given by aset $N=\{1, \ldots,n\}$ . Aplayer $i’ \mathrm{s}$ finite pure
strategy space in the second stage game is denoted by $X_{\dot{l}}$ , with $X=\mathrm{x}:X_{\dot{8}}$ .
Let A $(X_{1}.)$ denote the set of mixed strategies for $i$ , and let IIS $=\mathrm{x}:\Delta(X_{\dot{l}})$ .
We denote by $x:,$ $x,$ $\mu_{\dot{*}}$ , and $\mu$ generic elements of $X,$ $X,$ $\Delta(X_{1}.)$ , and A
respectively. For simplicity, we sometimes use $x_{i}$ and $x$ to denote $\mu$. and
$\mu$ respectively that place probability one on $x_{\dot{\iota}}$ and $x$ . Aplayer $i’ \mathrm{s}$ payoffi
in the second stage game are given by avon Neumann-Morgenstern utility
function $v$: : $Xarrow \mathrm{R}$ .
3Contracts without Interdependence
3.1 Model
Let us consider the case when the contracts (the promises in the first stage)
are not interdependent. In this case each agent’s transfer scheme does not
depend on any other’s transfer nor receipt scheme and each agent’s receipt
scheme does not depend on any other’s transfer nor receipt scheme.
Atransfer function profile announced by player $i$ in the first stage is de-
noted by $t_{*}$. $=(ti1, \ldots,t:(:-1),t:(*\cdot+1), \ldots,t_{1n}.)$ , where $t_{j}\dot{.}$ : $Xarrow \mathrm{R}_{+}$ repraeents
$i’ \mathrm{s}$ promises to $j$ as afunction of actions chosen in the second stage. Let $T$
be the set of all possible $t_{\dot{\iota}j}$ . Let $t=(t_{1}, \ldots,t_{n})$ . Atransfer function profile
$t_{:}=(t_{i1}, \ldots, t_{(\dot{l}-1)}:, t_{i(:+1)}, \ldots,t_{\dot{*}n})$ announced by player $i$ meets his budget
constraint if $\sum_{j\neq i}t_{ij}(x)\leq\max\{0,v_{\dot{*}}(x)\}$ for all $x$ . Aprofile $t=(t_{1}, \ldots,t_{n})$
of transfer function profiles is called feasible if every $\iota_{:}$ meets $i’ \mathrm{s}$ budget con-
straint.
Areceipt function profile announced by player $i$ in the first stage is de
noted by $r_{\dot{l}}=(r_{\dot{\iota}1}, \ldots,r_{1(:-1),:(:+1)}.r, \ldots, r_{n})$ , where $r_{ij}$ : $Xarrow\{0,1\}$ repre
sents $i’ \mathrm{s}$ acceptance (1) or rejection (0) of transfer ffom $j$ as afunction of
actions chosen in the second stage. Let $r=(r_{1}, \ldots,r_{n})$ .
Given aprofile $t$ of transfer function profiles and aprofile $r$ of receipt
function profiles in the first stage, and aplay $x$ in the second stage game,
the payoff $U_{i}$ to player $i$ becomes
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$U_{i}$ (x, t,$r)=v_{i}(x)+ \sum_{j\neq i}(r_{ij}(x)t_{ji}(x)-r_{ji}(x)t_{ij}(x))$ .
Given aprofile $t$ of transfer function profiles and aprofile $r$ of receipt
function profiles in the first stage, and aplay $\mu$ in the second stage game,




Let $EU_{}( \mu)=\sum \mathrm{x}_{k}\mu_{k}(x_{k})v_{\dot{\iota}}(x)$ .
Let NE $(t,r)x$ denote the set of (mixed) Nash equilibria of the second stage
game given $(t, r)$ in the first stage. Let NE represent the set of (mixed)
Nash equilibria of the underlying game (the second stage game without side
contracts).
Astrategy profile $\mu\in\Delta$ of the second stage game together with avector
$\overline{u}\in \mathrm{R}^{n}$ of payoffs such that $\sum_{i}\overline{u}_{\dot{l}}=\sum_{i}EU_{}(\mu)$ is supportable if there exists
asubgame perfect equilbrium of the two stage game where some $t$ and some
$r$ are announced in the first stage and $\mu$ is played in the second stage on the
equilibrium path, and $EU_{i}(\mu, t, r)=\overline{\mathrm{h}}.$.
Astrategy profile $\mu\in\Delta$ of the second stage game together with avector
$\overline{u}\in \mathrm{R}^{n}$ of payoffs such that $\sum_{i}\overline{u}_{1}$. $= \sum_{:}EU_{i}(\mu)$ is feasibly supportable if
there exists asubgame perfect equilibrium of the two stage gaane where some
feasible $t$ and some $r$ are announced in the first stage and $\mu$ is played in the
second stage on the equilibrium path, and $EU_{i}(\mu,t,r)=\overline{u}.$ .
3.2 Analysis
There exists acase when some set of efficient actions $\mathrm{m}m\mathrm{i}$-mizing the total
payoff is not supportable with any payoff distribution even if there exists a
pure equilibrium of the underlying game.
Observation 1. There is a case where some $(\overline{x},\overline{u})$ such that $\sum_{:}\overline{u}_{\mathrm{t}}=$
$\sum_{i}v_{\dot{l}}(\overline{x})$ and $\sum_{:}v_{\dot{l}}(\overline{x})\geq\sum_{\dot{*}}v:(x)$ for all $x$ is not supportable even if there
einists:x for all $i$ such that $:x\in NE$ and $v:(:x)\leq\overline{u}_{\dot{*}}$ .
Proof of Observation 1. Consider a $\mathrm{t}\mathrm{w}\sim \mathrm{p}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{y}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{r}$game of prisoners’ dilemma.
The payoffs are represented as follows.
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$C$ $N$
$C$ 2, 2 -1, 4
$N$ 4, -1 0, 0
Let 1and 2denote the row and the column players respectively. Consider
$(\overline{x},\overline{u})=((C, C),$ $(a, b))$ with $a$ 1 $b=4$ . It is easy to note $\sum_{1}.\overline{u}_{l}=\sum_{i}v:(\overline{x})$
and $\sum_{1}.v:(\overline{x})\geq\sum_{:}v_{\dot{l}}(x)$ for an $x$ . Moreover, $(N, N)\in NE$ and $v:(N, N)\leq$
$\overline{u}_{\mathrm{t}}$ for each $i$ if $a\geq \mathrm{O}$ and $b\geq 0$ .
Suppose $(\overline{x},\overline{u})=((C, C),$ $(a, b))$ is supportable. Then, there exists a
subgame perfect equilibrium of the two stage game where some $t$ and some
$r$ are announced in the first stage and $\overline{x}$ is played in the second stage on the
equilibrium path, and $EU_{\dot{\iota}}(\overline{x},$ $t,r$
$\overline{x}\in NE(t, r),$ $r_{21}(N, \mathrm{C}?)$ $=1$ . $\mathrm{T}$
of $t_{1}$ and $r_{1}$ such that $\hat{t_{12}}(x)=\{$
$)=-\%.$ .Suppose $a\leq b$ or $a\leq 2$ . Since
herefore, if 1announces $\hat{t_{1}}$ and $\hat{r}_{1}$ instead
1.5 if $x=(N, C)$ and $\hat{r}_{12}(x)=\mathrm{O}$ for0otherwise
all $x$ , then NE $((\hat{t_{1}},t_{2}),$ $(\hat{r}_{1}, r_{2}))=\{(N, C)\}$ and his payoff after transfer
amounts to 2.5, which is greater than $\overline{u}_{1}$ . This contradicts the assertion
$(\overline{x},\overline{u})=((C, C),$ $(a, b))$ is supportable. Even for the case when $a\geq b$ , another
contradiction will be similarly reached. $\blacksquare$
4Interdependent Contracts
4.1 Model
Next, let us consider the case when the contracts are interdependent. In this
case each agent’s transfer scheme (indirectly) depends on the others’ receipt
schemes and each agent’s receipt scheme depends on the others’ transfer
schemes.
Atransfer function profile announced by player $i$ in the first stage is
denoted by $t_{i}=(t:1, \ldots,t\dot{*}(*\cdot-1), t*\cdot(:+1), \ldots, t_{\dot{*}n})$ , where $t_{\dot{l}j}$ : $X\mathrm{x}Zarrow \mathrm{R}_{+}$ with
$Z=\{0,1\}$ represents $i’ \mathrm{s}$ promises to $j$ as afunction of actions chosen in the
second stage and indicators 0and 1. Indicator 0means that according to
the transfer and receipt schemes announced in the first stage, aplayer rejects
transfer from some other. Indicator 1means that according to the transfer
and receipt schemes announced in the first stage, every player accepts transfer
from any other.
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Note that if $t_{ij}(x, z)=z\tau_{ij}(x)$ for some $\tau_{ij}$ : $Xarrow \mathrm{R}_{+}$ , then the transfer
scheme becomes degenerate, or $t_{ij}(x, z)=\mathrm{O}$ for all $x$ , unless every player
accepts transfer ffom the others. That is, when players are expected to
promise acceptance to each other such transfer function can be sensitive to
aplayer’s deviation on the receipt scheme.
Let $T$ be the set of all possible $t_{ij}$ . Let $t=(t_{1}, \ldots, t_{n})$ . Atransfer function
profile $t_{:}=(t_{i1,\ldots,(\dot{l}-1),:(i+1)}t,\cdot t, \ldots, t_{in})$ announced by player $i$ meets his
budget constraint if $\sum_{j\neq:}t_{ij}(x, z)\leq\max\{0,v:(x)\}$ for all $x$ and all $z$ . A
profile $t=(t_{1}, \ldots, t_{n})$ of transfer function profiles is called feasible if every $t_{:}$
meets $i$ ’s budget constraint.
Areceipt function profile announced by player $i$ in the first stage is de
noted by $r_{\dot{l}}=(r_{i1,\ldots,:(i-1)}r,r_{\dot{*}(i+1)}, \ldots,r_{\dot{l}n})$ , where $r_{\dot{l}j}$ : $(T^{n-1})^{n}arrow\{0,1\}$
represents $i’ \mathrm{s}$ acceptance (1) or rejection (0) of transfer from $j$ as afunc-
tion of profiles of transfer function profiles announced in the first stage. Let
$r=(r_{1}, \ldots,r_{n})$ .
Given aprofile $t$ of transfer function profiles and aprofile $r$ of receipt
function profiles in the first stage, and aplay $x$ in the second stage game,
the payoff $U_{\dot{l}}$ to player 2becomes
$U_{}(x, t, r)=v:(x)+ \sum_{j\neq i}(r_{\dot{*}j}(t)t_{j*}. (x, a(t, r))-r_{ji}(t)t_{\dot{l}j}(x, a(t, r)))$
where $a(t,r)=\mathrm{x}:\dot{o},:\neq jr\dot{\iota}j(t)$ .
Given aprofile $t$ of transfer function profiles and aprofile $r$ of receipt
function profiles in the first stage, and aplay $\mu$ in the second stage game,
the expected payoff $EU_{\dot{*}}$ to player $i$ becomes
$\sum_{x}\mathrm{x}_{k}\mu_{k}(x_{k})\{$
$EU_{1}$. $(\mu, t, r)=$
$v:(x)+ \sum_{j\neq i}(r_{\dot{l}j}(t)t_{ji}(x, a(t, r))-rji(t)t_{j}(x, a(t,r))))$
where $a(t,r)=\cross:,j,:\neq jrij(t)$ . Let $EU_{1}.( \mu)=\sum_{x}\mathrm{x}_{k}\mu_{k}(x_{k})v:(x)$ .
The definitions ofNE $(t,r),$ NE, supportability, and feasible supportabil-




Any set of efficient actions maximizing the total payoff is supportable with
some payoff distribution.
Proposition 1. $(\overline{x},\overline{u})$ such that $\sum_{:}\overline{u}_{i}=\sum_{:}v_{i}(\overline{x})$ is supportable if there
eists $:\mu$ for all $i$ such that $:\mu\in NE$ and $EU_{1}$. $(:\mu)\leq\overline{u}_{i}$ .
Proof of Proposition 1. Suppose for $(\overline{x},\overline{u})$ with $\sum_{:}\overline{u}_{1}$. $= \sum_{1}.v:(\overline{x})$ , there
exists $:\mu$ for all $i$ such that $i\mu\in NE$ and $EU_{\dot{*}}(:\mu)\leq\overline{u}_{i}$ .
Let $\tau_{ij}$ ; $Xarrow \mathrm{R}_{+}$ be such that $\tau_{\dot{l}j}(x)=\mathrm{O}$ for aU $x\neq\overline{x}$ , and $\overline{u}_{\dot{l}}=$
$v_{1}.( \overline{x})+\sum_{j\neq*}$.
$(\tau_{j:}(\overline{x})-\tau_{1j}.(\overline{x}))$ where $\tau_{1j}.(\overline{x})>0$ for some $j$ implies $\mathcal{T}j|.(\overline{x})=0$









Consider the folowing strategy profile $(\mu, t,r)$ .
(1) $(t, r)=(\overline{t},\overline{r})$ ;
(2) if $(t, r)=(\overline{t}, (\overline{r}-:,\hat{r_{1}}.))$ for some $i$ , where
$\hat{r_{\dot{l}j}}(\overline{t})=1$ for all $j\neq i$ , then $\mu=\overline{x}$ ;
(2-1) if $(t,r)=((\overline{t}_{-\dot{\iota}},\hat{t_{1}.}),$ $(\overline{r}$-:, $\hat{r_{\dot{l}}})$ ) for some $i$ , where
$\hat{t_{}}\neq\overline{t}_{1}$. or $\hat{r_{\dot{\iota}}}\neq\overline{r}_{i}$ such that $\hat{r_{j}.}.(\overline{t})=0$ for some $j$ , then $\mu=:\mu$ ;
(2-2) otherwise $\mu\in NE(t,r)$ .
Note first that for all $i,$ $\overline{x}\in NE(\overline{t}, (\overline{r}_{-:},\hat{r_{}}))$ and $U_{1}$. $(\overline{x},\overline{t}, (\overline{r}-:,\hat{r_{1}}.))=\overline{u}_{i}$ if
$\hat{r_{\dot{l}\mathrm{j}}}(\overline{t})=1$ for all $j\neq i$ .
Suppose $(t, r)=((\overline{t}_{-:},\hat{t_{i}}),$ $(\overline{r}$-:, $\hat{r_{\dot{l}}})$) for some $i$ , where $\hat{t_{\dot{l}}}\neq\overline{t}_{1}.$.If $\mu=\tilde{\mu}=$
$(i\mu-j,\hat{\mu}_{j})$ for some $j$ , then when $j\neq i$
$EU_{j}(\mu, t, r)$
$= \sum_{x}\mathrm{x}_{k}\tilde{\mu}_{k}(x_{k})(v_{j}(x)+\sum_{k\neq j}(r_{jk}(t)tkj(x, a(t, r))-r_{kj}(t)t_{jk}(x, a(t,r))))$
$= \sum_{x}\mathrm{x}_{k}\tilde{\mu}_{k}(x_{k})(\begin{array}{l}\sum_{k\neq j_{\prime}k\neq}\dot{,}(r_{jk}(t)t_{kj}(x,a(t,r))-r_{kj}(t)\mathrm{t}_{jk}(x,a(\mathrm{t},r)))v_{j}(x)++(r_{j\dot{\iota}}(\mathrm{t})t_{j}\dot{.}(x,a(\mathrm{t},r))-r_{ij}(\mathrm{t})\mathrm{t}_{j\dot{*}}(x,a(\mathrm{t},r)))\end{array})$
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$v:(x)+ \sum_{k\neq\dot{\iota}}(r:k(t)t_{ki}(x, a(t, r))-r_{kl}(t)t_{\dot{l}k}(x, a(t,r))))$
$v:(x)+ \sum_{k\neq\dot{\iota}}(r_{1k}.(t)\cdot 0-0\cdot \mathrm{t}:k(x, a(t,r))))$
$= \sum_{x}\mathrm{x}_{k}\tilde{\mu}_{k}(x_{k})v:(x)=EU_{i}(\tilde{\mu})\leq EU.\cdot(_{i}\mu)\leq\overline{u}.$ .
Suppose $(t, r)=(\overline{t}, (\overline{r}-:,\hat{r_{i}}))$ for some $i$ , where $\hat{r_{\dot{l}}}\neq\overline{r}_{1}$.such that $\hat{r_{\dot{l}j}}(\overline{t})=0$
for some $j$ . If $\mu=\tilde{\mu}=(:\mu_{-j},\hat{\mu}_{j})$ for some $j$ , then when $j\neq i$
$EU_{j}(\mu,t,r)$
$= \sum_{x}\mathrm{x}_{k}\tilde{\mu}_{k}(x_{k})(v_{j}(x)+\sum_{k\neq j}(r_{jk}(t)t_{k\mathrm{j}}(x,a(t, r))-r_{kj}(t)tjk(x, a(t,r))))$
$= \sum_{x}\mathrm{x}_{k}\tilde{\mu}_{k}(x_{k})(v_{j}(x)+\sum_{k\neq j_{1}k\neq}\dot{.}(r_{jk}.(t)t_{kj}(x,a(t,r))-r_{kj}.(t)t_{jk}(x,a(t,r)))+(r_{j}(t)t_{1j}(x,a(t,r))-r_{\dot{l}j}(t)t_{j1}(x,a(t,r))))$
$= \sum_{x}\mathrm{x}_{k}\tilde{\mu}_{k}(x_{k})(v_{j}(x)+\sum_{k\neq j,k\neq:}(1\cdot 0-1\cdot 0)+(1\cdot 0-r_{1j}.(t)\cdot 0))$







$(r:k(t)t_{b}.(x, a(t, r))-r_{k*}.(t)t:k(x, a(t,r))))$
$(v_{i}(x)+ \sum_{k\neq 1}$. $(r:k(t)\cdot 0-1\cdot 0))$
: $(x)=EU_{1}.(\tilde{\mu})\leq EU_{1}.(:\mu)\leq\overline{u}_{\mathrm{t}}$ .
$x$
Thus, (1)$-(2- 2)$ constitutes asubgame perfect equilibrium where $(\overline{t},\overline{r})$ is
announced in the first stage and $\overline{x}$ is played in the second on the equilibrium
path, and $U_{\dot{l}}(\overline{x},\overline{t},\overline{r})=\overline{u}_{i}$ . $\blacksquare$
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Note that $\overline{t}$ in the proof of Proposition 1is sure to be feasible when
$\overline{u}_{i}\geq 0$ for all $i$ . That is, any set of efficient actions maximizing the total
payoff is feasibly supportable with some payoff distribution if there exists an
equilibrium of the underlying game in which each player enjoys nonnegative
payoff without side payments.
Proposition 2. $(\overline{x},\overline{u})$ such that $\sum_{:}\overline{u}_{i}=\sum_{:}v_{i}(\overline{x})$ and $\overline{u}_{i}\geq 0$ is feasibly
supportable if there eists $i\mu$ for all $i$ such that $:\mu\in NE$ and $EU_{\dot{*}}(_{\dot{\iota}}\mu)\leq\overline{u}_{*}.$.
5Weakly Interdependent Contracts
5.1 Model
Finally, let us consider the case when the contracts are wealdy interdepen-
dent. In this case each agent’s transfer scheme does not depend on any other’s
transfer nor receipt scheme while each agent’s receipt scheme depends on the
others’ transfer schemes.
The definitions of transfer function profiles and their feasibility are the
same as those for the contracts without interdependence (Section 3). The
definitions of receipt function profiles are the same as those for the interde
pendent contracts (Section 4).
Given aprofile $t$ of transfer function profiles and aprofile $r$ of receipt
function profiles in the first stage, and aplay $x$ in the second stage game,
the payof[ $U_{1}$. to player $i$ becomes
$U_{\dot{*}}(x,t,r)=v_{i}(x)+ \sum_{j\neq i}(r_{\dot{l}j}(t)t_{j:}(x)-r_{j:}(t)t_{\dot{l}j}(x))$.
Given aprofile $t$ of transfer function profiles and aprofile $r$ of receipt
function profiles in the first stage, and aplay $\mu$ in the second stage game,




Let $EU_{1}.( \mu)=\sum_{x}\mathrm{x}_{k}\mu_{k}(x_{k})v:(x)$ .
The definitions ofNE $(t, r),$ NE, supportability, and feasible supportabil-




When players are two, any set of efficient actions maximizing the total payoff
is supportable with some payoff distribution if there exists apure equilibrium
of the underlying game.
Proposition 3. Let $n=2$ . Then $(\overline{x},\overline{u})$ such that $\sum_{i}\overline{u}_{i}=\sum:v:(\overline{x})$ and
$\sum_{i}v_{\dot{\iota}}(\overline{x})\geq\sum_{:}v_{i}(x)$ for all $x$ is $suppo\hslash able$ if there eists $|.x$ for all $i$ such
that $:X\in NE$ and $v_{i}(_{i}x)\leq\overline{u}_{i}$ .
Proof of Proposition 3. Suppose for $(\overline{x},\overline{u})$ with $\sum_{:}\overline{u}_{i}=\sum_{:}v_{\dot{l}}(\overline{x})$ and
$\sum_{1}.v_{i}(\overline{x})\geq\sum_{i}v_{i}(x)$ for ffi $x$ , there exists $ix$ for all $i$ such that $:x\in NE$ and




Note $\overline{x}\in NE(\overline{t},\overline{r})$ and $U_{\dot{l}}(\overline{x},\overline{t},\overline{r})=\overline{u}.\cdot$ .
Consider the following strategy profile $(\mu,t, r)$ .
(1) $(t, r)=(\overline{t},\overline{r})$ ;
(2) if $(t,r)=(\overline{t}, (\overline{r}_{j},\hat{r_{1}}.))$ and $\hat{r_{i}}(\overline{t})=1$ , then $\mu=\overline{x}$ ;
(2-1) if $(t, r)=(\overline{t}, (\overline{r}_{j}, \hat{r_{\dot{l}}}))$ and $\hat{r_{}}(\overline{t})=0$ , then $\mu\in\{:x, (:x_{\dot{\iota}},\overline{x}_{j})\}\cap NE(t, r)$ ;
(2-2) if $(t, r)=((\overline{t}_{j},\hat{t_{i}}),$ $(\overline{r}_{j},\hat{r_{i}})),$ $\hat{t_{\dot{*}}}\neq\overline{t}_{\dot{l}}$ , and $\hat{r_{i}}(\overline{t}_{j},\hat{t_{i}})=0$, then $\mu=_{*}$. $x$ ;
(2-3) if $(t, r)=((\overline{t}_{j},\hat{t_{\dot{\iota}}}),$ $(\overline{r}_{j},\hat{r_{\dot{\iota}}})),$ $\hat{t_{\dot{l}}}\neq\overline{t}_{i}$ , and $\hat{r_{i}}(\overline{t}_{j},\hat{t_{\dot{\iota}}})=1$ , then $\mu\in$
$\{_{i}x, (_{:}x_{j},\overline{x}_{1}.)\}\cap NE(t,r)$ ;
(2-4) otherwise $\mu\in NE(t, r)$ .
Suppose $(t,r)=(\overline{t}, (\overline{r}_{j},\hat{r_{i}}))$ and $\hat{r_{\dot{l}}}(\overline{t})=1$ for some $i$ . Then, NE $(t,r)=$
NE $(\overline{t},\overline{r})$ . Hence $\overline{x}\in NE(t,r)$ , and $U_{i}(\overline{x},t,r)=U.\cdot(\overline{x},\overline{t},\overline{r})=\overline{u}_{t}$ in the
subgame (2).





$v_{j}(x)+ \max\{0, v:(x)-\overline{u}_{\dot{l}}\}$ if $x_{j}=\overline{x}_{j}$
$v_{j}(x)$ otherwise





$v:(x)- \max\{0,v_{i}(x)-\overline{u}_{i}\}$ if $xj=\overline{x}j$
$v:(x)$ otherwise
$\leq v_{i}(x)\leq v_{\dot{l}}(_{i}x)$ .
Hence, if $:x\not\in NE(t,r)$ , then $U_{j}((_{\dot{|}X:},\overline{x}j),t,r)\geq U_{j}((:X_{\dot{l}j},x),t,r)$ for all $Xj$ ,
and $\overline{t}_{\dot{l}}(_{\dot{*}}X:,\overline{X}_{j})>0$ , which implies $U_{\dot{*}}((:x_{i},\overline{x}_{j}),t,r)=\overline{u}_{i}\geq U_{1}.((x_{\dot{*}},\overline{x}j),t,r)$
for all $X:$ . That is, if $|.x\not\in NE(t,r)$ , then $(:x:,\overline{x}j)\in NE(t,r)$ . Thus,
$\{:x, (\iota x:,\overline{x}_{j})\}\cap NE(t,r)\neq\emptyset$ , and for all $x_{j}$ ,
U.$\cdot$ $((:x:,x_{j}),t,r)\{$ $=_{\dot{l}} \leq|(_{i}x)\leq\overline{u}_{\dot{l}}\frac{v}{u}$
. $\mathrm{i}\mathrm{f}\overline{t}_{\dot{l}}(_{i}x_{i},x_{j})=0$
if $\overline{\mathrm{t}}_{i}(_{i}X:, X_{j})>0$
in the subgame (2-1).
Suppose $(t,r)=((\overline{t}j,\hat{t_{\dot{l}}}),$ $(\overline{r}j,\hat{ri})),$ $\hat{t_{\dot{*}}}\neq\overline{t}_{\dot{*}},$ and $\hat{r_{1}}$. $(\overline{t}j,\hat{t_{\dot{l}}})=0.$ Then,
NE $(t,r)=NE$ since $\overline{r}_{j}(\overline{t}_{j},\hat{t_{i}})=0$ as well. Hence {$x\in NE(t,r)$ , and
$U_{\dot{l}}(:X,t,r)=v_{1}.(_{:}x)\leq\overline{u}_{\dot{l}}$ in the subgame (2-2).







while if $\mu=x=(:x:,\hat{x}\mathrm{j})$ , then
$U_{j}(x,t, r)=v_{j}(x)+(\overline{r}_{j}(\overline{t}_{j},\hat{t_{\dot{l}}})\hat{t.\cdot}(x)-\hat{r.}.(\overline{t}_{j},\hat{t_{\dot{l}}})\overline{t}_{\mathrm{j}}(x))$
$=v_{\mathrm{j}}(x)+(0-\overline{t}_{j}(x))$
$\leq v_{j}(x)\leq v_{\mathrm{j}}(|.x)$ .
Hence, $\mathrm{i}\mathrm{f}_{i}x\not\in NE(t,r)$ , then $U_{\dot{*}}((:x_{j},\overline{x}_{1}.),t,r)\geq U_{i}((:x_{j},x_{i}),t,r)$ for all $x_{*}.$ ,
and $\overline{t}_{j}(_{i}x_{j},\overline{x}_{\dot{*}})>0$ , which implies $U_{j}((:xj,\overline{x}_{1}.)$ , $t,r)=\overline{u}j\geq U_{j}((xj,\overline{x}),t,r)$
for all $x_{j}$ . That is, if $:X\not\in NE(t,r),$ then $(:xj,\overline{x}_{1}.)\in NE(t,r)$ . Thus,




in the subgame (2-3).
Thus, (1)$-(2- 4)$ constitutes asubgame perfect equilibrium where feasible
$\overline{t}$ and $\overline{r}$ are announced in the first stage and $\overline{x}$ is played in the second stage
on the equilibrium path, and $U_{i}(\overline{x},\overline{t},\overline{r})=\overline{u}_{\dot{l}}$. $\blacksquare$
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Note that $\overline{t}$ in the proof of Proposition 3is sure to be feasible when $\overline{u}_{i}\geq 0$
for all $i$ . That is, when players are two, any set of efficient actions maximizing
the total payoff is feasibly supportable with some payoff distribution if there
exists apure equilibrium of the underlying game in which each player enjoys
nonnegative payoff without side payments.
Proposition 4. Let $n=2$ . Then $(\overline{x},\overline{u})$ such that $\sum_{:}\overline{u}_{\dot{\iota}}=\sum_{:}v_{\dot{l}}(\overline{x}),$ $\overline{\mathrm{h}}$. $\geq 0$ ,
and $\sum_{:}v_{\dot{\iota}}(\overline{x})\geq\sum:v:(x)$ for all $x$ is feasibly supportable if there nists:x
for all $i$ such that {$x\in NE$ and $v_{i}(_{:}x)\leq\overline{u}_{\dot{l}}$ .
6Concluding Remarks
We found that there is aclass of (feasible) side contracts which may induce
efficient equilibrium play in $\mathrm{t}\mathrm{w}\sim \mathrm{p}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{y}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{r}$ games as well as in three-0r-more-
player games (Propositions 1and 2). What to do next is to see whether
the contracts proposed here are the simplest ones in the class. In fact there
exist simpler (feasible) side contracts for tw0-player games (Propositions 3
and 4). We will find out whether three-0r-more-player games also have such
alternatives.
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